“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.
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This entry has no external links. Mental states can be reclpe and separated from physical states because of their ability to misrepresent and also to change the information given to them through bodily sensations. Trackback URL janetthomas says: Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind Physicalism in Metaphysics categorize this paper. Yehudah Freundlich – – Dialogue 16 3: We intuitively understand that there are many kinds of things that can be about other things, for example photographs are ffor their contents.
And instead of requiring P to result in acts as if C we instead require P to result in acts appropriate to the mode of presentation as if C.
A Recipe for Thought
A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. Chisholm accounts for the intentionality of thoughts through language, semantics, and mental expectation. Classical and Contemporary Readings, D. If they had a physical determining factor they would not be a mental state because they would be derived from rrecipe perceptions.
Sign in to use this feature. The philosopher Fred Dretske investigated the claims of the late philosopher Roderick Chisholm who argued that intentional states could only be mental states. Gordon Giles – – Philosophy Now However, even Dretske asserts that bodily sensations are mental perceptions and therefore are intentional Byrne n.
Email required Address never made public. Create a free website or blog at WordPress. Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind. For Dretskep. Recently I have been considering the idea that it is only possible to determine if a system is conscious by examining how the state of the system in a given instant is connected to previous and subsequent moments, as well as the properties of the system at that moment which are cor some theories consider relevant for consciousness.
To remedy this we add the criterion that not only must P usually be caused by C but that Dretskf must cause the system to act including thought-acts as if C. The criterion for this primitive intentionality is that a property, P, of a system is about some feature of the world, C, if and only if the presence of P is usually caused by C.
mental_content [Philosophy of Mind]
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: This claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n. With the claim that intentionality is necessary for mentality it can be countered with the claim that sensations are mental states that are non-intentional Byrne n.
A sentence can be intentional yet be completely separate from intentionality and also sentences that report mental states need not be intensional Byrne n.
Added to PP index Total downloads 6, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 3of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Chalmers, D J ed. Examples that he gives are dark clouds, tree rings, or smoke.
This article has no associated abstract. This essay will explore the claims made by Chisholm and Dretske and ascertain the validity of their arguments as to whether the all the contents of the mind are physical or mental states. Talk of the use of a compass gives it an intensional context. They have no physical determining factor.
Bart Geurts – – Cambridge University Press. However, intentional phenomena like the compass, although able to misrepresent the information it was designed to deliver, is reliant on us to be able to do it. You are commenting using your WordPress.